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hat is a human being? For centuries, and even today, 
many have considered man to be a breathing organism 
endowed with a higher intellect—a rational animal. This 
classification seems to serve the twofold purpose of presenting man 
as quite similar to other beings while highlighting his one key 
distinction. For Aristotle (arguably the most influential of the Greek 
philosophical giants), the faculty of reason suffices to distinguish 
mankind from the rest of nature. Implicit in this understanding is that 
the existence of a being with such a faculty is purely contingent. 
Therefore, it is not at all far-fetched to imagine a world devoid of 
humans. Nature would simply continue to operate and even to be 
perceivable in just the same way as it is now. Since we are merely 
beings that happen to be present along with the multiplicity of other 
beings, all aspects of nature, even the elusive concept of time, reside 
outside of ourselves; they may be perceived by us, but they do not 
arise from or depend upon us.   
 Standing forth as one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth 
century is Martin Heidegger. A prolific yet enigmatic German, 
Heidegger regards the above metaphysical/Aristotelian definition of 
mankind as entirely inadequate. By asserting the historicality and 
ultimate temporality of Dasein (the being for whom Being is an 
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issue), Heidegger seeks to return to the originary question of Being, 
the Greek Inception that long ago became obscured and concealed by 
metaphysics’ reduction of all entities to mere presence-at-hand, 
finally establishing that humanity—Dasein—is time itself. 
 
I. The Demise of the Inception 
 
 Throughout Heidegger’s works runs what seems to be a 
continuous strain of nostalgia for the Ancient Greeks. However, his 
longing for a return to the ancients is far more than mere romanticism. 
Having come from a background imbibed with Christianity (spending 
time himself in Jesuit formation), he reacted in an intensely negative 
way towards Catholic dogma. One who adheres to a faith has already 
had the question of Being answered for him; thus, he cannot approach 
it authentically—he no longer lives with the question1 Rather, the 
question of philosophy, the broadest, deepest, and most originary 
question—Why are there beings at all instead of nothing?—never 
comports itself to its times, but imposes itself upon the times. It 
“either projects far beyond its own time, or else binds its time back to 
this time’s earlier and inceptive past.”2 In response to modernity’s 
“rootless organization of the average man,”3 Martin Heidegger seeks 
some sort of restoration of the Greek Inception: when untimely 
philosophy first stood forth among humanity. What did this inception 
consist in? Why and how did it devolve? 
 At the dawn of philosophy, a particular “fundamental orientation 
to Being”4 had been set forth by the thinkers and poets such that 
beings were thought of as a whole as phusis—what emerges from 
itself, an unfolding and persistence, the emerging-abiding sway “by 
virtue of which beings first become and remain observable.” Phusis 
encompasses both Being and becoming, embodying all of heaven and 
earth, past and present, high and low.5 It shaped and informed the 
Greek society as a whole—its underlying relation to Being. While 
effects of this great inception still reverberate today, all philosophy 
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since then has been a mere devolvement of understanding of the true 
nature of Being as such. 
 “[The philosophy of the Greeks] came to an end in greatness with 
Aristotle.”6 As is Heidegger’s custom, he reverses common 
perceptions of time and relationality. The philosophy of the Greeks 
came to an end with Plato and Aristotle. But, really, the philosophy of 
the Greeks began to come to an end with these thinkers. Its “end” was 
actually the end of its beginning, its inception. The end of the 
inception was not an end of the Greek relationship to Being, but 
rather the beginning of its downward trajectory away from phusis and 
towards beings. The Greek relation to Being does continue 
(vestigially) to remain even today, gradually concealing itself. Plato 
and Aristotle lay only on the cusp of this downward trajectory. Yet 
this was somehow the end, the greatest and most lamentable moment: 
the reduction of Being—phusis—to “beingness”—ousia.7  
 Perhaps the greatest and the closest philosopher to the rightful 
conception of Being, Aristotle receives the bulk of Heidegger’s 
criticism. In his Metaphysics, Aristotle almost follows the 
understanding of Being as phusis, seeking the “first causes of being as 
being.”8 However, from the start, the reduction of philosophy to prose 
and logic gives away the fall from the initial inception. “Only poetry 
is of the same order as philosophical thinking,” both of which bring 
beings out of their monotony and everydayness.9 In contrast to 
Aristotle, the pre-Socratics admired by Heidegger and most closely 
associated with the Greek Inception—Parmenides and Heraclitus—
wrote in verse. 
 Aristotle seemed to direct his thoughts inward upon beings at the 
expense of Being in his focus on ousia, the underlying substance 
behind things. Thus begins the Greek “ontology of Vorhandenheit,” 
or the present-at-hand.10 In their search for the essence of Being, the 
Greeks narrowed their focus upon the observable world 
(Vorhandenheit), intending to then abstract the meaning of Being as 
such. However, this approach has shown itself to be fruitless. This 
error pervades and persists to this day: the end of the inception 
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occurred when philosophy had begun to mistake nature for the 
world.11 
 
II. Aristotle, Mankind, and Time 
 
 For the moment, let us leave Heidegger behind and explore 
Aristotle on his own terms, particularly his Metaphysics. “All human 
beings by nature stretch themselves out toward knowing.”12 Knowing 
comes from the senses. Therefore, we take pleasure in using the 
senses. The greatest sense (and this underlies Platonism as well—
images) is sight, for it is the most comprehensive, most 
discriminating, and most freeing sense. For Aristotle and Plato, to 
know something is to see it as it is. From this concept comes the 
Platonic term eidos, which is translated “idea,” but literally means the 
“look” of a thing. To seek wisdom in philosophy is the highest form 
of seeing, the fulfillment of wonder, and the highest activity in which 
man can engage. 
 Wonder leads to both poetry and philosophy. These answer the 
great questions of mankind. Ought they both to be pursued? The 
poets’ assertion of divine jealousy provides the reason for Aristotle’s 
assertion that poets lie and should not be followed—“many lyrics are 
lies.”13 Therefore, philosophy is the one avenue to the satisfying of 
wonder. This wonder is unique to man—the animals do not wonder 
because they do not have such a faculty; the gods do not wonder 
because they already know all things. Philosophy is the highest 
activity of man because it aims higher—and it can only do this 
because man is not the highest being, but occupies a particular space 
in the realm of being.14 
 It would seem that man is that being who wonders, who thinks. 
However, Aristotle, in defining the essence of man, decides not to do 
so starting with what makes man unique, but from what makes him 
the same. While the Metaphysics emphasizes mankind’s reaching 
towards knowing, i.e., wonder, Aristotle elsewhere (De Anima III.11) 
compiles human nature into a concoction of the essence of a plant, 
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with the addition of the essence of an animal and the addition of 
wonder/intellect. A substance is defined by its essence—the 
combination of all these things. Therefore, Aristotle defines man’s 
essence from things which are present in the world.15 
 Here, we see the  above-mentioned shift from phusis to ousia at 
work. Man, as the being that wonders, is yet grouped with all other 
objects of the senses, analyzed, and categorized in the same way that 
trees, rocks, and gods are categorized. All sense of the unfolding of 
Being is gathered into the small sense of discovery—the wisest 
person knows all things.16 Therefore, for the wisest person, there 
would be nothing left to be disclosed. To live is merely to be 
present.17 
 One of the few things studied by Aristotle that absolutely resists 
being placed into the world as present-at-hand is the concept of time. 
In his Physics, the question of “Does time exist?” is posed before an 
inquiry is made as to its nature.18 Time is difficult to deny as part of 
our existence; yet it cannot be pinpointed as existing in the way in 
which other objects of study exist. Perhaps time is the chain of 
“nows,” but the now ceases to be immediately as it comes into 
existence. Can it, then, be said to be at all? 
 We can indeed say that time is by virtue of there being change. 
However, our experience of time, despite the uniformity of days, 
weeks, and years, is not at all consistent. Hours seem to fly by in an 
instant while asleep. Time moves quickly when we are occupied and 
slowly when we are bored. Yet based on the motions of the heavens, 
it seems that it is our experience only of time, and not time itself, that 
varies. This poses interesting new questions as to the nature of time. 
 It seems, prima facie, that time is identical with change or 
movement; when things are changing rapidly, time seems to go 
quickly; when things do not seem to be changing at a sufficient rate, 
time moves slowly. When we are asleep and do not perceive change 
at all until we rise, it seems that the “now” of rising happened 
immediately after the “now” of falling asleep, although we know that 
hours have passed. However, while change gives us some sense of 
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time, it cannot be identical with time itself. Change is movement in 
space, yet time has no position in space. Furthermore, our only direct 
way of experiencing time is through the now. The memory tells us 
that there have been other “nows” that are no longer accessible, and 
we know that this now will immediately pass into oblivion and be 
replaced by a new now. In its very becoming, the now is destroyed. 
Therefore, it is not a unit of time, but an infinitely divisible 
connection that can never be fully present as such.19 Because of this, 
time, in a sense, can be said not to be; it is never fully present. Yet, 
without time, there can be no presence; all things appear in a now. 
 Time as it actually is, according to Aristotle—future and past 
connected by the always-present now (“it is the now that measures 
time”)—is not identical with change or movement. Rather, it is the 
measure of change in respect to the before and after.20 The now links 
the before to the after, the past to the future. It marks the end of the 
past and the beginning of the future in the same way that a circle is 
both concave and convex. The essence of time is the now, which is 
always the same as every other now, yet completely unique because 
things in the world have changed. Although time is not present to us 
in the way that things in the world are present, it is undoubtedly there 
and necessary. The now cannot “stop,” for in its becoming, it 
immediately gives way to another now. “Time will not fail, for it is 
always at a beginning.”21 
 
III. Heidegger, Destruction, and Restoration 
 
 The task at hand in Being and Time—to set metaphysics free 
from the accretions which have gathered since the Greek Inception—
must be accomplished through destruction of the ontology of 
Vorhandenheit.22 In section II of this essay, Aristotle’s Physics was 
the primary source used. According to Heidegger, it is actually the 
Physics of Aristotle which grounds his Metaphysics by establishing 
the ontology of Vorhandenheit: the fall of man—Dasein—to mere 
presence-at-hand.23 
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 The Greek approach to beings—seeking out the look, the eidos, of 
a thing—was taken for granted as the sole way to approach Being. 
However, the look of things is only perceived through the interpretive 
lens of the being of Dasein. Failing to acknowledge or account for 
this, the post-inception Greeks turned their inquiry inwards upon 
themselves, attempting to circularly arrive at the substance of 
mankind through the very lens of mankind—an absurdity akin to 
seeking the inner workings of a telescope by using the telescope to 
search. The assumption was made that man must be merely one being 
among others. This insufficient classification does not become an 
ontological problem for these philosophers, as Heidegger claims it 
should have.  
 In defining man as rational animal, something living which has 
reason, man is understood as being present-at-hand: Vorhandenheit.24 
However, “over and above the attempt to determine the essence of 
‘man’ as an entity, the question of his Being has remained forgotten . 
. . [it] is rather conceived as something obvious or ‘self-evident’ in 
the sense of the Being-present-at-hand of other created Things.”25 It 
is this conception of the being of man that Heidegger attempts to 
completely subvert. This is what he intends by the destruction of 
metaphysics: not to eradicate it, but to shake off all that has followed 
from the reduction of man to present-at-hand and then to rebuild from 
the original, foundational, inceptive Phusis. 
 What, then, is Heidegger’s answer for the Being of man, of 
Dasein? While the scope of this essay is not to explicate exhaustively 
the Being of Dasein as described in Being and Time, the following, 
cursory considerations should be sufficient to adequately draw several 
conclusions in comparison with Aristotle. 
 We know that “the person is not a Thing, not a substance, not an 
object.”26 We know that the answer cannot be derived from empirical 
science or from the look of a thing, for this already presumes an 
ontical understanding of Being; but the ontological foundations are 
always already ‘there.’27 These foundations, overlooked by Aristotle 
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and concealed for centuries by the very nature of Being itself, are 
what Heidegger explores and seeks out in Being and Time.  
 What is our relationship to Vorhandenheit? For Dasein, things are 
meaningful, not quantitative. “All ‘wheres’ are discovered and 
circumspectively interpreted as we go our ways in everyday dealings; 
they are not ascertained and catalogued by the observational 
measurement of space.”28 Our understanding of things in space is not 
that they are plotted out in a system of coordinates; our spatiality is 
entirely relational. Something is “above,” “below,” “on the floor,” or 
“in the sky.” We carry with us ideas of left and right.29 “Dasein is 
‘spatial’ with regard to its Being-in-the-world.”30  
 Relationality and concern in regard to the present-at-hand, 
however, hardly exhaust the Being of Dasein. The most profound 
expression of this Being is Dasein’s relation to itself. Everyday 
Dasein, in its normal failure to take notice of Being as such, falls into 
the they-self, into averageness and inauthenticity. This is so common 
a state that Heidegger asserts that, proximally and for the most part, 
Dasein is “they.”31 Rather than live in the “they,” Dasein should seek 
to arrive at “Authentic Being-one’s-Self.”32 
 To be authentic, Dasein must understand itself as “thrown, fallen 
projection.” As thrown, Dasein is placed into its world not of its own 
accord. It did not decide where or when to be born, nor even to exist 
in the first place. As fallen, Dasein finds itself in the midst of and 
alongside other beings. As projection, Dasein futurally anticipates 
itself as possibilities; this is not formulating a plan, but letting those 
possibilities be as such.33 Dasein is what it has been, what it is, and 
what it becomes—allowing it to say with understanding to itself: 
“Become what you are.”34  
 In these ways, Dasein can be said to be in both the what has been 
and the what will be. Dasein is temporal. It is not merely “in time;” 
its very being is rooted in this temporality, this unity of past, present, 
and future in thrown, fallen projection. 
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IV. What is Time? 
 
 Reversing chronology, Heidegger intends to be the ancient of the 
ancients, “to proceed up towards the hidden roots of Greek thought in 
a more radical way than Aristotle himself ever did.”35 Aristotle was 
the greatest and the closest to the proper understanding of Being, 
reaching a “more original ground” than even Plato.36  
 Let us now recall Aristotle’s Physics. It is clear that time indeed 
is, but it is not in the way that other things are. His most concise 
formulation of time is: “those aspects of motion which we count with 
regard to before and after.”37 With all this in mind, it certainly cannot 
be denied that Dasein is. Yet, we see that Dasein (like time) is not in 
the same way that other things are. The mistake of ignoring the latter 
statement destroyed metaphysics, ended the Greek Inception, and sent 
philosophy spiraling downwards, further and further from the true 
essence of Being—phusis.  
 We now see clearly that Aristotle’s description of time, the one 
thing that he encountered as existing in an entirely different way than 
all other things (present-at-hand), ought to be applied to mankind 
itself. The connection of past, present, and future in Aristotle is at 
stake here. To Aristotle, being means that which is in the present. The 
past no longer is, and the future is not-yet.38 These are all, however, 
connected in his concept of time—no now can come into being of its 
own accord, but is rather begotten by the demise of the previous now. 
It takes its existence from all of the nows that preceded it, connecting 
them to all of the nows yet to come. This concept is precisely the 
thrown, fallen projection, the ultimate historicality, of Dasein. 
 Furthermore, the problem of individuation runs deeply within 
Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Heidegger asserts that time itself, Dasein’s 
temporality, is what individuates: it allows for Dasein’s “unique 
thisness and one-time-ness of its thereness, which it alone can seize, 
thus becoming entirely non-substitutable by any other being.”39 In 
Aristotle’s lowering of the essence of a being to its genus, he allows 
for ultimate and unbounded substitutability that is contrary to our 
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experience of the self and of others. In contrast to the modern 
“rootless organization of the average man,” the platitude “you are 
unique” still rings true, despite its triteness. 
 “To appreciate and study time, one must genuinely ask: ‘Am I 
time?’”40 The question is not formulated, “is humanity time?” Rather, 
arriving at an authentic understanding of oneself is intensely personal. 
While no Dasein can exist on its own (even a hermit has come from 
society/historicality), to live as thrown, fallen projection towards 
death, authentically embracing mortality is a feat that only the 
individual him or herself, in resoluteness, can achieve. The ultimate 
question of Being—of phusis—is lived with and explored, 
approached and re-asked, by each generation and each individual. To 
have an answer, however, is to eliminate the question. Rather, we 
must seek to live with the question. Being and Time ends, quite 
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